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The Message Is the Insurgency…. Astute practitioners on both sides of the conflict have reached the conclusion that the key weapon of insurgency is a strategic communications campaign.
--Col Thomas X. Hammes USMC
Introduction
The famous military historian B.H. Liddell Hart wisely reminds, "The withdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instrument, and exercises framed to teach how the enemy can be lured into a trap, closed by a counter-stroke or a devastating circle of fire." 1 Unfortunately, retrograding is all too often equated with failure; however, the withdrawal has been used throughout history to achieve great military results. 2 Its timely employment is especially critical during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, as the (foreign) government must look to minimize its military footprint whenever and wherever the security situation allows.
3 Accordingly, the US should conduct a drawdown from Iraq tied to a strategic communications message 4 and a condition of reduced violence, in order to draw the enemy combatants into a trap, attrite their center of gravity (CoG), 5 and increase security.
Background
The defensive 6 "surge" in Iraq was not only necessary, it was long overdue, and with the "Sunni Awakening," it has created a culminating point for the enemies of security. 7 According to MCDP 1-0, "The objective of the defense is to force the enemy to reach his culminating point without achieving his objectives, to 
Increased Security
Security is paramount in COIN operations, 20 but several secondary benefits also stem from a troop reduction. First, bringing home US personnel sends a positive message to the enemies' primary audience, the US public. 21 Moreover, Americans,
and their representatives will gladly back a winning fight, especially if it shows signs of the war ending. 22 The reduction in violence following the surge and the Sunni "awakening" have 
Counterarguments
The initial argument against withdrawing in the near future is that 'it is a defeatist policy showing weakness that will yield the same outcome as Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia.' On the contrary, every "war" is different, and Vietnam et al were unconditional retreats following a perceived defeat. In this case, the Coalition and Iraqi government are winning against a diverse and incoherent threat, and the withdrawal is conditional. Additionally, a drawdown at some point in the future is inevitable; how this change is communicated is critical to setting a new precedence for US withdrawals, and the current plan requires nothing from the enemy in return for the retrograde. The author does not argue for an immediate withdrawal; however, seizing the initiative and retrograding from a position of strength instead of overstaying the welcome and feeding an "anti-occupation" insurgency is a better option.
A second argument is that insurgents never negotiate in good faith. Of course, the US never could or would sit down and negotiate with all the insurgents, terrorists, and foreign actors in Iraq. This policy calls for the one-sided dictation of the terms of the transition. Fortunately, insurgents have been known to adhere to "ceasefires" temporarily when the terms satisfy their agenda.
24
Finally, one could argue that withdrawing troops would leave a security vacuum and halt or even reverse the progress of the "surge." On the contrary, the reduced violence creates the perfect environment for the newly trained Iraqi security forces to take over. Also, the withdrawal would be gradual with the remaining US troops continuing to hunt and kill the enemy alongside the Iraqis. Lastly, suspensions or even reversals of the drawdown provide commanders with the flexibility to meet this contingency.
Conclusion
In the near future, the US will decide a troop reduction in Iraq is warranted, and immediately afterward, the strategic communications battle with the terrorists regarding the reason for the retrograde will begin. 25 Simultaneously, a tremendous opportunity will arise to pacify Iraqi nationalists and negative foreign influences by explaining the condition for a continued US withdrawal: increased security in Iraq. Failing to explain the conditions of the drawdown is a wasted opportunity. For purely self-serving reasons, these enemies of security would curtail attacks to facilitate the exodus. Many will not forget about their goals after months of reduced violence, but they will lose the passion and support of their cause. Furthermore, a few months of security and prosperity can be as contagious as the months of escalation were in the past. The enemies' common desire for reductions in US conventional combat power will entice them to suspend attacks to a level the Iraqis can handle, thus sacrificing their cause and bringing security to Iraq.
Appendix A
The insurgent is almost always heavily outgunned; therefore, his strategic center of gravity is invariably his cause or idea. 26 This cause can also be equated to a conventional enemy's combat power. When a strong message resonates with the people, the government is in trouble. Conversely, when it rings hollow, is usurped, or voided by the government, the insurgency will dry up. Retired Marine Col T.X. Hammes explains, "The idea they [insurgents] fought for was central to their resistance. In fact, they were counting on political power generated by that idea to neutralize the overwhelming military power of the government." 27 Take away his guns and bombs, and the insurgent will use stones and common chemicals if driven by a strong enough desire, but take away his cause, and his rebellion will whither on the vine.
